The Federalist Papers: No. 10*
To the People of the State of
AMONG the numerous advantages
promised by a well constructed
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.
These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and
injustice with which a factious spirit has tainted our public
administrations. There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the
other, by controlling its effects.
There are again two methods of removing the causes
of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its
existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same
passions, and the same interests.
It could
never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it was worse than the
disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which
it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which
is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be
to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it
imparts to fire its destructive agency.
The second expedient is as impracticable as the
first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he
is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the
connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his
passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be
objects to which the latter will attach themselves.
The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property
originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests.
The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the
protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the
possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and
from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective
proprietors, ensues a division of the society into
different interests and parties.
The latent
causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them
everywhere brought into different degrees of activity, according to the
different circumstances of civil society. A
zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and
many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to
different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to
persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human
passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with
mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each
other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this
propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no
substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful
distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and
excite their most violent conflicts. But
the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal
distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property
have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and
those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a
manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many
lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them
into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The
regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task
of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the
necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed,
and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.
If a
faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican
principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular
vote. It may clog the administration, it
may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its
violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction,
the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to
its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other
citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger
of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of
popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are
directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of
government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long
labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.
By what
means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the
same passion or interest in a majority at the same time must be prevented, or
the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by
their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect
schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to
coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied
on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and
violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number
combined together, that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.
From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a
society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer
the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs
of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be
felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert result from the
form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to
sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is that such
democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever
been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and
have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their
deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government,
have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in
their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized
and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
A republic,
by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place,
opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure
democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy
which it must derive from the
The two
great points of difference between a democracy and a republic are: first, the
delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens
elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater
sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.
The question resulting is, whether small or
extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper guardians of
the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two
obvious considerations:
In the first place, it is to be remarked that,
however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a
certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that,
however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to
guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of
representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the two
constituents, and being proportionally greater in the small republic, it
follows that, if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than
in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and
consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.
In the next place, as each representative will be
chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic,
it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the
vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the
people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the
most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters.
It must be confessed that in this, as in most
other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be
found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the
representatives too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and
lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to
these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue
great and national objects. The federal Constitution forms a happy combination
in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the
national, the local and particular to the State legislatures.
The other point of difference is, the greater
number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the
compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this
circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded
in the former than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably
will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct
parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same
party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the
smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they
concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take
in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other
citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all
who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each
other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a
consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always
checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
Hence, it
clearly appears, that the same advantage which a
republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is
enjoyed by a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by the
In the
extent and proper structure of the
PUBLIUS. (James Madison)
* Edited for brevity. Emphasis added.